Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 4

5-1-2015

Italy, Mexico, and the Legal Framework for Clientelism
Christopher L. Henry

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher L. Henry, Italy, Mexico, and the Legal Framework for Clientelism, 15 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp.
Law 92 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol15/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized
editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Article
Italy, Mexico, and the
Legal Framework for Clientelism
Christopher L. Henry*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ..............................................................................................1
II. Discussion of Terms ...............................................................................2
III. Selection of Cases ..................................................................................6
IV. Mexico’s Turbulent Democratic History ...............................................8
V. Modern Political Corruption in Mexico ...............................................10
VI. Mexican Corruption and the Law ........................................................12
VII. Alleviating Mexican Clientelism........................................................17
VIII. Italy’s Recent Electoral History ........................................................19
IX. Italian Governmental Corruption .........................................................21
X. Italian Corruption and the Law .............................................................23
XI. Alleviating Corruption in Italy ............................................................26
XII. Comparing Italy and Mexico ..............................................................27
XIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................28
I. Introduction
A great deal of political science literature concerns what exactly
constitutes “clientelism” and how this concept applies to Mexico and Italy.
Very little literature exists, however, which examines these countries’
histories in light of this problem. Furthermore, none have examined the
degree to which the legal framework of each of these countries has
facilitated clientelism. A country’s legal framework can help shape its
democratization process, and studying the law in two countries which are
widely regarded as having clientelistic practices can give new insights into
how democracies consolidate.
Section II of this article defines the terms “clientelism” and
“corruption” and discusses their interrelatedness based on political science
academic literature. Section III discusses the similarities and differences
between Italy and Mexico, and highlights why a comparison between the
two is appropriate. Section IV provides background information
concerning Mexico’s efforts to become a consolidated democracy, and
discusses how political corruption has undermined these efforts. Section V
*
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shifts this discussion to how corruption affects Mexico in the present day.
Section VI sets forth Mexico’s legal framework for corruption-related
offenses. Section VII discusses potential solutions to Mexico’s problems
with corruption. Section VIII provides information concerning Italy's
recent electoral history, and its past struggles with clientelism and
corruption. Section IX focuses on how Italy’s past clientelism has changed
form, and arguably still affects Italy’s modern political culture. Section X
provides Italy's legal framework surrounding corruption-related offenses.
Section XI discusses potential solutions for Italy’s problems with
corruption. Section XII provides a comprehensive comparison of the
political and legal framework concerning clientelism and corruption in
both Italy and Mexico. This article concludes that in order to effect
meaningful change, Italy and Mexico should enact an exogenous anticorruption commission.
II.

Discussion of Terms

Clientelism remains an important problem for countries attempting
to consolidate democracy. Clientelism is a difficult concept to define, and
encompasses a variety of different practices. However, in every form
clientelism generally has the following characteristics:
(a) the relationship occurs between actors of
unequal power and status;
(b) it is based on the principle of reciprocity;
that is, it is a self-regulating form of
interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of
which depends on the return that each actor
expects to obtain by rendering goods and
services to each other and which ceases once
the expected rewards fail to materialize;
(c) the relationship is particularistic and
private, anchored only loosely in public law
or community norms.”1
A particularly egregious practice that would constitute clientelism,
for example, is “the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct
payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services.”2
Corruption is commonly defined as “the misuse of public office for
private gain.”3 Clientelism and corruption are often linked, as the two
1

Derek W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, Clientelism, Patrimonialism and
Democratic Governance 3 (2002).
2
Mathew M. Singer, Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship between
Clientelism and Corruption 5 (2009).
3
William L. Richter, and Frances Burke, Combating Corruption, Encouraging Ethics: A
Practical Guide to Management Ethics 89 (2d ed. 2007).
2
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concepts share the manipulation of public resources.4 However, the two
terms are distinguishable. Clientelism is an umbrella term that includes
different categories. “Authoritarian clientelism” is clientelism kept in
place by force.5 Jonathan Fox, a Professor at the School of International
Service, wrote extensively on the definition of clientelism, and on
clientelism's effect on Mexican political culture. In defining
“semiclientelism,” he stated that if one could imagine a continuum with
authoritarian clientelism on one end, and the absence of clientelism on the
other, the gray areas where outright clientelism has declined but has not
disappeared could be thought of as semiclientelism. 6 Semiclientelism
should be used to describe regimes in transition from clientelistic
authoritarianism to pluralist democracy. 7 Governments engaged in
semiclientelism are more likely than governments engaged in authoritarian
clientelism to use open, democratic practices, rather than force.8
Clientelism stunts the accumulation of social capital because, as
there is a specialized relationship between the patrons and their clients,
some actors are inevitably excluded.9 These actors are then not able to
participate in the process of interaction that would normally result in the
building of social capital.10
Clientelism may also undermine the rule of law.11 The rule of law
is a key component of democratization, and its absence (or the perception
of is absence) is likely to have a negative impact on a country's
governmental efficacy. 12 Clientelism also increases the incentives for
politicians to go through alternative channels to achieve their policy
interests.13
Corruption in government can prove difficult to eliminate. 14
Corruption also might lower a regime’s popular legitimacy.15 In other
words, if a nation’s citizens see their elected officials engaging in corrupt
practices the citizenry is less likely to believe that their officials have their
best interests in mind.16 A low perception of governmental legitimacy also
arguably undermines a regime’s stability.17
4

Singer, supra note 2, at 2.
Jonathan Fox, How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social
Capital in Rural Mexico, 24 WORLD DEV. 1089, 1091 (1996).
6
Id. at 1092.
7
Id.
8
John Durston, Building Social Capital in Rural Communities (Where it Doesn't Exist)
16 (1998).
9
Id. at 15-16.
10
Id.
11
Singer, supra note 2, at 3.
12
Id. at 10.
13
Id. at 22.
14
Id. at 25.
15
Mitchell Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative
Study of Four Latin American Countries, 64 J. POL. 408, 413 (2002).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 418.
5
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According to Guillermo O’Donnell, a deceased prominent
Argentine political scientist, particularism (inside of which he includes
clientelism) 18 “is antagonistic to one of the main aspects of the full
institutional package of polyarchy: the behavioral, legal, and normative
distinction between a public and private sphere.”19 Therefore, clientelism
is inherently incompatible with consolidated democracy because a
democratic society is supposed to be propelled “not by particularistic
motives but by universalistic orientations to some version of public
good.”20
Clientelism is problematic for democracy for a number of reasons.
Clientelism undermines the building of social capital because it slows
overall economic growth. 21 Building social capital requires social
programs to benefit the community as a whole in order to efficiently
distribute public goods.22 Clientelism undermines both the rule of law and
a nation’s political accountability, and increases incentives for politicians
to raise revenue through corrupt channels.23
As neither Mexico nor Italy use force to keep their clientelistic
practices in place, neither could accurately be called authoritarian
clientelism. Mexico could arguably have been classified as authoritarian
clientelism in the past due to the pervasive influence of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party's (“PRI”) in political culture. However, the PRI’s
influence has lessened to the point that Mexico could be called
semiclientelism. 24 Though it seems less clear, the DC’s influence on
Italian culture has waned to the extent that, like Mexico, Italy might also
occupy the gray area known as semiclientelism.
III.

Selection of Cases

Clientelism and corruption often take place in countries with “high
levels of poverty, weak democratic institutions, short democratic histories,
and a large state economic presence.” 25 Although these traits do not
generally describe Italy, Mexico does have relatively weak democratic
institutions, a short democratic history (as the vast majority of its history
18

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines particularism as “a political theory that each
political group has a right to promote its own interests and especially independence
without regard to the interests of larger groups.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 858 (9th Ed. 1983). In other words particularlism, like clientelism, favors the
interests of small portions of the population over the population’s interests holistically.
19
LARRY DIAMOND, MARC F. PLATTNER & PHILIP J. COSTOPOULOS, DEBATES ON
DEMOCRATIZATION 29 (2010).
20
Id.
21
Pak Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 68 (2001).
22
Durston, supra note 8, at 4.
23
Singer, supra note 2, at 22.
24
Jonathan Fox, The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from
Mexico, 46 WORLD POL. 151, 158-159 (1994).
25
Id. at 2.
4
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has been under one party dominance) and a high income disparity.26 Even
if Mexico does not have a large state economic presence, this has become
true only recently.27 In contrast, Italy has a low income disparity,28 a fairly
long democratic history,29 and has adopted neoliberal economics.30 Italy
does have fairly weak democratic institutions, however. Some of Italy's
democratic institutions have been compromised by pervasive corruption,
especially in bureaucratic fields.31
Italy and Mexico have been on opposite sides of the spectrum
throughout most of history. Italy was a colonizing country and Mexico
was colonized.32 Mexico has maintained its current system of government
since 1917,33 while Italy has seen numerous transitions.34 Mexico and Italy
are also in completely different geographic “neighborhoods.”35 To Italy’s
west are consolidated democracies with low rates of governmental
corruption, but to its east are former Soviet satellite states with high rates
of corruption.36 To Mexico’s north are the North American countries, with
relatively low rates of corruption,37 and to its south are the Latin American
countries with higher rates of corruption.38
However, there are also similarities between the two. Both
countries are relatively wealthy. Mexico and Italy rank eleventh
(1,845,000 in millions of USD) and twelfth (1,805,000 in millions of
USD) in terms of nominal GDPs, respectively.39 Both countries rank low
on the Corruption Percentage Index, with Italy ranking as the 69th least
corrupt country and Mexico ranking as the 106th least corrupt.40 These two
facts taken together put both countries in an interesting position: Mexico is
26

Global Peace Index - Gini Coefficient, Visions of Humanity (2007), available at
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/GINI.
27
See generally PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI GODARD & JOHN WILLIAMSON, AFTER THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 170 (2003).
28
Global Peace Index - Gini Coefficient, supra note 26.
29
PAUL GINSBORG, A HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY ITALY 402 (Palgrave Macmillan
2003).
30
ANDREA MUEHLEBACH, THE MORAL NEOLIBERAL: WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN
ITALY 16 (2012).
31
See generally M. T. Galanti, Is Italian Bureaucracy Exceptional? Comparing the
Quality of Southern European Public Administrations, 3 BULL. IT. POL. 5, 26 (2011).
32
Field Listing: Independence, CIA World Factbook (2014), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088.
33
Mexico,
CIA
World
Factbook
(2014),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html.
34
Italy,
CIA
World
Factbook
(2014),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html.
35
See generally Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, Transparency International
(2013),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2013/results.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), CIA World Factbook (2013), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html.
40
Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, supra note 35.
5
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the most corrupt country in North America, and Italy is the most corrupt
founding member of the EU.41
This paper will seek to explain how two countries with different
histories, geographical locations, and political cultures could share
significant problems with corruption.
IV.

Mexico’s Turbulent Democratic History

Mexico under the PRI had the longest-lasting dominant single
parties in Mexico’s history.42 Although the current Mexican system of
government has made progress in eliminating the inherent corruption of
dominant party politics, existing problems with corruption have proved to
be difficult to eliminate.43
As it is not constitutionally permissible for the President to run for
reelection, the incumbent President was historically allowed to select his
successor, as the country only had one viable party.44 Though alternative
parties were allowed to exist, elections were frequently fixed.45 As the
corruption in the Mexican political system became more widely
recognized, these alternative parties began gaining momentum. This
culminated in the election of Vincente Fox, a member of the rival party
PAN, in 2000.46
Latin America had borrowed large quantities of money from
foreign countries leading up to the 1980’s. 47 When the United States
government attempted to strictly control inflation, it contributed to a Latin
American recession. 48 This new austerity resulted in general
dissatisfaction with the current political regimes in Latin American
countries by their citizens.49 Many countries in the region then adapted the
Washington Census, which led to a general broadening of democracy,
albeit with a greater economic disparity.50 Mexico’s entrance into NAFTA
may also have helped with the country’s democratization process.51
41

Id.
Kenneth F. Greene, Dominant Party Strategy and Democratization, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI.
16, 22 (2008).
43
Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Results, supra note 35.
44
STEPHEN D. MORRIS, CORRUPTION & POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 43 (1991).
45
James A. McCann and Jorge I. Domínguez, Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and
Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior, 17
Electoral Studies 483, 484 (1998).
46
Polity IV County Report 2010, Political Instability Task Force (2010), available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Mexico2010.pdf.
47
PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI GODARD & JOHN WILLIAMSON, supra note 27, at 21-22.
48
See generally id.
49
See generally id. at 22.
50
Alicia Girón, International Monetary Fund: From Stability to Instability. The
Washington
Consensus and Structural Reforms in Latin America, in GLOBALIZATION IN THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, 43, 51-53 (2008).
51
Mara Steffan, The Political Impact of NAFTA on the Mexican Transition to
Democracy,
1988-2000,
10
J.
INT'L
AFFAIRS
(2007),
available
at
42
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Nonetheless, democracy was seen as under assault after the 2006
Mexican presidential campaign, as both the PRI and Party of Democratic
Revolution (“PRD”) were widely suspected of committing voter fraud.52
The degree to which these claims are accurate is debatable, but the civil
unrest that resulted suggests that Mexico might not yet be a fully
consolidated democracy.
The PRD has begun to show aspects of clientelism, even after the
PRI lost much of its stranglehold on Mexican politics.53 In 2004, the
PRD’s party leaders stated publicly that its factionalization54 had led to a
heightened rivalry in the party.55 According to Tina Hilgers, a Professor at
Concordia University, the PRD “ally with vendor, taxi, and squatter
organizations, using the groups’ electoral strength to increase their own
bargaining power in negotiations for positions and policy direction inside
the party. In return, they provide preferential treatment to the
organizations' members.” 56 Hilgers points to the long history of
clientelism in Mexican politics, Mexico’s poverty, and its prospects of
political stability as possible reasons why the PRD have successfully
implemented such tactics.57
V.

Modern Political Corruption in Mexico

Extensive corruption exists among the Mexican elite.58 A 2002
survey determined that the Mexican public’s low perception of legitimacy
for their government might in part be caused by corruption,59 although
there was no way to prove direct causality.60 Furthermore, a comparative
study of four Latin American countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay
and Bolivia) by Selingson alleges that political corruption does, indeed,
undermine the perception of legitimacy of government.61 This brings up
several questions concerning Mexico’s clientelism and its electorate.
If political corruption does indeed undermine the people’s idea of
legitimacy, to what extent does this corruption appear in Mexico?
Jonathan Fox explored Mexico’s progress in establishing both free and fair
http://bcjournal.org/volume-10/.
52
Mark Weisbrot, Irregularities reveal Mexico's election far from fair, The Gaurdian,
(2012)
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/09/irregularities-reveal-mexicoelection-far-from-fair.
53
Tina Hilgers, Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in
Comparative Perspective, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 121, 134 (2008).
54
To “factionalize” means “to split into factions.” “factionalize.” Merriam-Webster.com.
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/factionalize (2015).
55
Hilgers, supra note 53, at 132.
56
Id. at 134.
57
Id. at 138.
58
Seligson, supra note 15, at 413-414.
59
Id. at 413.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 429-431.
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elections and associational autonomy in the context of their relationship to
clientelism.62 Fox stated that even though Mexico held elections, it failed
to meet the threshold for democracy in the 1990s.63 Discussing Mexico’s
transition to a more semiclientelist government, Fox stated “[W]hile the
transition from clientelism to semiclientelism may look like a step in the
direction of responsive government, the erosion of strict controls on voter
compliance may also increase the incentives for state managers to rely on
electoral fraud to minimize uncertainty. This may be happening in
Mexico.”64 Thus, although agents of reform in Mexico may have given the
appearance of making significant change, they may also have merely
shifted the avenues through which political corruption might be utilized.
Increased citizen oversight over the distribution of food, the National
Solidarity Program aimed at improving the conditions of the poor, and the
National Indigenous Institute have had mixed success in balancing the
autonomous and semiclientelist forces within the Mexican government.65
Somewhat counter-intuitively, one reason Mexico might have a
corruption problem is because members of congress and the president are
prohibited from running for consecutive terms.66 Reforming laws such as
these might spawn the birth of a new class of “career politicians” who
would be motivated to keep clean for fear of losing their jobs.67 Changing
these laws would likely only be a partial fix, however, many countries
where politicians can run consecutive terms also have high rates of
corruption.
VI.

Mexican Corruption and the Law

Mexico has ratified three anti-corruption conventions: the
Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (ICAC), the OECD’s Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).68
The OAS provides standards of correct conduct and mechanisms to
enforce said standards. 69 The convention prohibits bribery (broadly,
including the discharge of official duties in order to gain any advantage)
and the official misuse of property.70 The agreement took effect in 1997.71
62

Fox, supra note 24, at 152-154.
Id. at 181.
64
Id. at 160-161 (emphasis in original).
65
See generally id. at 169-170.
66
LEE STACY, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 278 (Marshall Cavendash, 2002).
67
See generally Mathew R. Cleary, Electoral Competition, Participation, and
Government Responsiveness in Mexico, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 296-297 (2007).
68
Frederick T. Stocker, SURVEYING MEXICO'S ANTI-CORRUPTION LANDSCAPE 10 (2012).
69
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Art. III available at
http://oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html.
70
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Art. VI.
71
Stocker, supra note 68, at 10.
63
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Member states complying with the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
must have established that bribery of a foreign public official 72 and
money laundering 73 are both crimes punishable by law, and provide
accurate monetary accounting. 74 The Convention also provides for
extradition between member states.75
Italy and Mexico are both members of the UNCAC. 76 The
UNCAC provides that each member state must “develop and implement or
maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the
participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper
management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency
and accountability.” 77 Member states are required to develop and
implement policies which affect these general principles.78 The UNCAC
also seeks to facilitate public trust through transparency in the
procurement of government contracts79 and public reporting.80 It requires
criminal penalties for the following crimes: bribery of national public
officials, bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public
international organizations, embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of
functions, illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of
property in the private sector, laundering of proceeds of crime,
concealment, and obstruction of justice.81 The UNAC also provides for
international cooperation among member states for conducting criminal
investigations. 82 The Mexican Constitution defines “public official” as
follows:
(i) persons who have been elected as
representatives in a public election;
members of the federal judiciary office, and
members of the judiciary office of the
federal district; (ii) officers, employees and
72

The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Art. I available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
73
The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Art. VII.
74
The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Art. VIII.
75
The OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Art. X.
76
United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of
5 September 2014, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014) available at
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
77
United Nations Convention against Corruption, Art. V available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/0850026_E.pdf [herenafter “UNCAC”].
78
UNCAC, Art. VI.
79
UNCAC, Art. IX.
80
UNCAC, Art. X.
81
UNCAC, Arts. XV-XXV.
82
UNCAC, Art. XLIII.
9
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in general any person who fills an
employment position or commission of any
nature in the federal congress or in the
legislative congress of the federal district;
and (iii) public officials of autonomous
agencies, who shall be responsible for acts
or omissions featured during their respective
terms and duties.83
In 2012, the Mexican Senate approved the Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor’s Office.84 The Office has still not been approved by the lower
house in the Mexican legislature.85
Mexico has also adopted a variety of statutes which prohibit
bribery of domestic foreign officials, including the following: the Federal
Law on Administrative Accountability of Public Officials (which applies
to all federal public officials and those who handle public resources), the
Federal Law on Accountability of Public Officials (which applies to
executive officials and some judges), the Federal Law on Transparency
and Access to Government Public Information, the Law on Government
Acquisitions, Leases and Services, the Law on Government Construction
and Public Work and Related Services, the Federal Law Against
Organized Crime and the Federal Criminal Code.86 Additionally, several
laws require that books kept by corporations be accurate, including the
Commercial Code, the General Corporation and Partnership Law and the
Federal Tax Code.87 Article 111 of the Federal Tax Code sets a penalty
range of 3 months to 3 years imprisonment for those who violate the
accurate record keeping provisions.88 Bribes are not deductible.89
Violations of the Federal Criminal Code can result in fines,
imprisonment and dismissal of a public official.90 If the bribe does not
exceed “500 times the annual minimum wage in Mexico City” then the
term of imprisonment could vary from three months to two years.91 If the
amount of the bribe exceeds 500 times the annual minimum wage in
Mexico City then the sentencing range is from two to fourteen years.92
These laws will only be applied foreign corporations if the
following conditions are met:
83

Luis Rubio Barnetche, Bertha Alicia Ordaz Aviles and Hector Cuevas Gonzalez,
Mexico, in ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION 175 (2013).
84
Stocker, supra note 68, at 11.
85
Id.
86
Barnetche, Aviles and Gonzales, supra note 83, at 172.
87
Id. at 175
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Stocker, supra note 68, at 12.
91
Id. at 13.
92
Id.
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(1) the offender is within Mexican territory or the
crime has an effect in Mexico... (2) the offender has
not been tried in the country in which he perpetrated
the crime; and (3) the crime that is being prosecuted
is considered a crime in both the foreign country
and Mexico. 93
The Federal Anti-Corruption Law for Government Procurement
applies to a great deal of conduct in its prohibition of bribery, including
the following conduct:
promising, offering or delivering money or
any other gift to a public official or to a third
party in consideration for doing or refraining
from doing any act that is within such public
official’s duties or within the duties of
another public official, for the purposes of
obtaining or maintaining certain benefits or
advantages, regardless of whether the money
or gift is accepted or received, or whether
the expected result is actually obtained;
promising or offering money or any other
gift to a third party that may intervene, in
any way, in the design and drafting of any
call for a public auction or of any other act
in connection with a federal public
contracting procedure;
undertaking conducts that imply or have the
purpose or effect of obtaining any unlawful
benefits or advantages in federal public
contracting;
intervening personally, but upon behalf of a
third party that is banned from participating
in a federal public contracting procedure, for
purposes of such third party obtaining,
whether totally or partially, the benefits that
are embedded in the corresponding contract;
and
promoting or using influence, economic or
93

Id.
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political power, whether real or fictitious, on
any public official, for purposes of obtaining
a personal benefit or advantage, or a benefit
or advantage for a third party, regardless of
whether there is any acceptance by the
public official, or whether the expected
result is actually obtained.94
In 2012, Mexico adopted the Federal Anti-Corruption in Public
Procurement Law, which applies to everyone involved with the federal
government,95 and prevents Mexican individuals and entities from bribing
foreign public officials.96 Individuals who violate this law face fines from
$5,000 to $250,000.97 Corporations face fines from $50,000 to $10 million
and face being disbarred for up to 10 years.98 Companies, however, may
disclose violations in order to receive lesser penalties.99
Individuals may also recover for bribery in tort, under Article 1910
of Mexico’s Federal Civil Code.100 Though the Ministry of the Public
Function is currently responsible for the administrative enforcement of
anti-bribery laws, it has recently been abolished.101 The formation of a
National Anti-Corruption Commission is being discussed to take its
place.102
Mexico clearly has an established legal framework to deal with
corruption. Nevertheless, it clear that problems with corruption still exist
in Mexico, as discussed earlier in this article. It is important to note that
recently the president of Mexico, Peña Nieto (ironically, a member of the
PRI) proposed the formation of a National Anti-corruption
Commission.103 This might be the exogenous actor the government needs
to destroy existing semiclientelistic channels. If the Commission is
approved, the degree to which it will be successful, obviously, will be
contingent upon its ability to keep itself free from outside sources of
corruption.
VII.
Several

Alleviating Mexican Clientelism

factors

can

be

antagonistic

towards

democratic

94

Barnetche, Aviles and Gonzales, supra note 83, at 173.
Stocker, supra note 68, at 13.
96
Id. at 14.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Barnetche, Aviles and Gonzales, supra note 83, at 174.
100
Id. at 173.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Mexico's Incoming President Proposes Anti-Corruption Commission, Latin American
Herald
Tribune
(2013)
available
at
http://laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=638527&CategoryId=14091.
95
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consolidation, including “biased electoral rules, principal-agent problems,
clientelism, and authoritarian political cultures.”104 These problems may
potentially be alleviated by promoting an active electorate and fostering
cooperation of the elites and the Mexican people.105
Merely holding elections, of course, does not ensure they are free
or fair. As long as clientelism in Mexico still exists, the will of the
Mexican people is more likely to be stifled by the will of the elite. Mathew
R. Cleary, an assistant professor of political science at Syracuse
University, operationalized both electoral competition and nonelectoral
political participation, and asserted that the best way to effectively end
clientelism in Mexico is through the latter.106 This increased participation
would include activities such as protests, assemblies and the holding of
frequent “town hall” style meetings in which a constituency can directly
meet with their representative to voice their concerns.107
Cleary’s research was in response to a popular hypothesis that
political corruption in Mexico would dissipate if there were more electoral
competition, and the apparent paradox that corruption remains despite
increased electoral competition.108 His research suggests the two were not
as related as previously thought, and that the only way to end such
practices would entail a great deal of citizen involvement.109
However, one of the drawbacks of this approach is that electoral
participation seems to be directly related to socioeconomic status and
literacy,110 and so increasing participation in order to improve government
responsiveness might involve underlying societal changes. In other words,
if Mexico continues to do well economically then corruption might solve
itself, because as its median level of income goes up so might electoral
participation.111 If this were the case, it would seem to coincide with
modernization theory.
VIII. Italy’s Recent Electoral History
Italy has undergone numerous regime changes in its political
history.112 Italy’s Christian Democracy (DC) became the dominating force
in politics, with the Italian Communist Party being the DC’s main
opposition. 113 However, during the late 1950s and ‘60s support for
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Christian Democrats faded.114 The DC, as a “catch all” party, began to
shift alliances with other parties to stay in power.115 The DC achieved this
goal consistently until it lost considerable support in 1994.116
In the late 1970s the clientelistic practices of the DC had begun to
take its toll on the Italian infrastructure.117 Giuseppe Di Palma, a professer
at the University of California, Berkely, noted that “[p]olitical clientelism
has built a spider web of partisan alignments and dealings reaching all
sectors of society.”118 Furthermore, clientelism affected “those connected
with the building and control of infrastructure, such as welfare, education,
housing, transportation, communication, cooperatives, and the like.”119
According to Mario Caciagli, a professor of comparative politics at the
University of Florence, “In the 1980s the whole Italian system seemed to
become an enormous clientelistic network.”120 Though the DC finally lost
its grip on Italy in 1994,121 it should be noted that there is significant elite
continuity from the DC into the contemporary Italian parties.122 This elite
continuity could be taken as one reason why clientelism, although not in a
“party” form, might still exist in Italy today.123
IX.

Italian Governmental Corruption

Transparency International has identified several major problem
areas relating to Italian governmental corruption. 124 First, the Italian
legislative branch has little independence from the executive branch,
which enables the executive branch to act without much accountability.125
Second, regulations concerning political donations are rarely enforced, and
the public does not have access to records of expenditures by political
parties.126 Corruption costs Italy €60 billion each year, but only €293
million is recovered through penalties.127 This is likely because OECD’s
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statute of limitations period bars many potential claims.128 Additionally,
Italy does not have an independent anti-corruption authority, and there is
no dedicated whistleblower legislation in Italy. 129 Transparency
International also noted, however, that Italy had made some
improvements, as Italy is considering additional legislation and resources
for public auditing have improved.130
Some have pointed to Italy’s large bureaucracy as an explanatory
variable for its widespread corruption.131 In Italy, bureaucrats have been
largely complacent about the problem of government corruption, and in
many cases are in place because of it.132 Partisan appointments have been
a major problem in Italy, especially because these appointments are
sometimes done for personal and partisan gains.133 As an example, Italy,
in an attempt to purge patronage from its government, requires all
prospective bureaucratic appointees to pass a civil service examination.134
However, the lengthy bureaucratic work that goes into the civil service
requirement meant that politicians could appoint temporary replacements
intermittently, sometimes over a period of years.135 Additionally, in some
cases these examinations were fixed.136 Between 1973 and 1990, nearly 60
percent of Italian civil servants were appointed outside normal
procedures.137 There have also been reports of Italian patrons exchanging
jobs for votes.138
Interestingly, one likely cause of Italy’s widespread corruption was
the campaign finance reform laws of 1974.139 When it was no longer
acceptable for corporations to openly donate to political parties, the
corruption became internalized – corporations unable to go through legal
channels to encourage politicians to vote for their interests, had greater
incentives to form backroom deals with elites.140 Corporations in Italy
have also demonstrated their willingness to give bribes to public
officials.141
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Italian Corruption and the Law

Italy has adopted a variety of international agreements in order to
alleviate its problems with corruption. These include the Convention on
the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU 1997, the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions 1997, the UN Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime 2000, the UN Convention against
Corruption 2003, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, and the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on
Corruption 1999. 142 The ratification process has begun on Combating
Corruption in the Private Sector, but it has not been finalized.143
The Italian Criminal Code (ICC) provides for fraud,
misappropriation and similar offenses. 144 Fraud is punishable by
imprisonment from six months to three years, and is used when more
specific fraud offenses do not apply.145 Government-contracting fraud is
punishable by one to five years’ imprisonment.146 The Civil Code provides
for offenses related to a corporation’s assets, activities and
communications. 147 Legislative Decree no. 58/1998 provides for the
offenses of market manipulation and insider trading.148
The ICC also prohibits bribery of a public official and persons in
charge of a public service if he or she “receives a consideration, or accepts
the promise of, money or other advantages/other things of value, in
relation to an act of his office.”149 Bribery offenses for domestic officials
under the ICC span a wide variety of conduct, and include proper bribery,
bribery for performance of the function, bribery in judicial acts, unlawful
inducement to give or promise anything of value, trafficking of unlawful
influences, and instigation to bribery. 150 Until 2002, there were no
offenses covering bribery of private corporate officers.151 Now, there are
also bribery offenses pertaining to private corporate officers, managers in
charge of bookkeeping and ordinary employees. 152 Corporations are
subject to fines of anywhere from €2,580 to €1.549 million.153 Terms of
imprisonment for individuals found guilty of bribery range from one to ten
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years, and vary based on the offense charged.154
The ICC also details offenses for money laundering, financing
terrorists and false accounting.155 Tax offenses under the ICC include
filing a fraudulent tax return by using false invoices, filing a fraudulent tax
return by using other fraudulent means, filing a false tax return, failure to
file a tax return, issuing false invoices, concealment or destruction of
account books and fraudulent underpayment of tax.156
Public prosecutors are responsible for investigating corruption
charges. 157 In investigating the above-mentioned offenses public
prosecutors may compel a person to attend an interview, compel the
production of documents, issue search warrants and seize funds in bank
accounts. 158 Corporations in which the management commits these
offenses may be subject to penalties, fines, disqualification and
confiscation.159
Non-criminal regulations that restrict corruption also exist. The
receipt of gifts by Italian government members and their relatives, Italian
public administration employees, and employees of state-owned or statecontrolled corporations is restricted.160
Italy has comparatively lighter punishments for domestic abuses
than Mexico. Though some might claim that the key to reducing
corruption in Italy lies in stiffer penalties for corruption-related offenses, it
is also possible that the key to reducing corruption in Italy is the more
proactive enforcement of existing laws. Again, perhaps this could be
accomplished by establishing a centralized agency through which to deal
with fraud.
If there are to be more stringent regulations established concerning
fraud, they should be narrow in scope in order to reduce semiclientelism in
Italy. While reducing bribery among Italian government officials and
foreign nationals might improve perceptions concerning the rule of law in
Italy, for example, this would do little to alter Italy’s existing political
structures. Instead, it might be more efficient to include penalties such as
permanent disqualification from office for domestic fraud in order to
reduce semiclientelistic practices.
XI.

Alleviating Corruption in Italy

Transparency International has a variety of recommendations for
how Italy can lessen some of its corruption problems, including adopting
stricter rules governing the conduct of elected officials, revising existing
statute of limitations periods for corruption-related offenses, introducing
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an educational program in schools dealing with the causes and
consequences of corruption and establishing an independent anticorruption body.161
Apart from the establishment of an exogenous entity to deal with
its corruption problems, 162 another potential way for Italy to reduce
corruption is for community organizations and NGOs to organize with the
purpose of forming a more responsive government.163
Perhaps Italy has yet to go completely through an extensive
consolidation process, and once it has maybe its institutions will be able to
defend themselves against clientelism. This scenario seems less likely,
however, as democracy is not necessarily a teleological process.
XII.

Comparing Italy and Mexico

For two countries with such stark differences, Mexico and Italy
both had very strong political parties that were able to take advantage of
their positions. In Mexico, the system allowed for complete dominance by
the PRI.164 In Italy, the proportional representation system meant that the
DC would have to form coalitions with other prominent parties to
consistently stay in power.165
In both Mexico and Italy, the existence of government officials
with unchecked power led to growth in governmental corruption. PRI-era
Mexico’s strong executive166 and its consistently PRI-led congress assured
there was little horizontal accountability to the system.167 This allowed
patrons to use subversive political channels without being held culpable.168
Italy’s bureaucracy, too, decreased the necessary horizontal accountability
to ensure the responsiveness of government.169 Bureaucrats, in many cases
appointed for party loyalties, look the other way instead of voicing
complaints against governmental corruption.170
Perhaps the most striking similarity between Italy and Mexico is
161
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that both countries had a single dominant party for a prolonged period of
time (or, in Italy, a party that was able to from coalitions to stay
consistently in the majority). This dominant party then took advantage of
power, seeking to maximize the likelihood of getting elected outside the
realm of democracy. Though any attempt to apply this to a larger pattern
might be extrapolation, as corruption exists without the existence of
political parties, in both of these instances whenever a single party
dominated the political process corruption became rampant.
Both countries had pervasive, corrupt party systems that abruptly
came to an end. The PRI, although still active in Mexico, is no longer the
only viable electoral choice.171 The DC dissolved in 1994, though there is
some continuity between the DC and modern Italian political parties.
Mexico has recently made strides away from clientelism. 172 While
corruption in Italy seems to have stagnated, despite new legislative efforts
to the contrary.173 The fate of these two nations will help analysts to
determine the causal relation (if indeed there is one) between dominant
party systems and the corruption they seem to create.
XIII. Conclusion
Both Mexico and Italy have purged themselves of dominant party
politics, but the clientelism of the previous administrations seems to have
become entrenched. In Italy’s case, a major factor seems to be that after
the DC was dissolved, many of its former members merely switched
parties. The pervasive corruption in both countries suggests that there need
to be major institutional changes to make the systems more accountable to
the electorates.
Mexico has become a consolidated democracy only recently, and
has since made strides toward alleviating its corruption problem. Italy, by
contrast, has been considered a democracy for a longer time, but its
corruption problems have endured. Both have made attempts to quash
their pervasive corruption problems, but have met with mixed success.
The future of clientelism in both countries is far from certain, but history
has shown that ending a pervasive corruption problem is difficult.
Perhaps the most striking thing about studying the anti-corruption
legislation of both Italy and Mexico is that both countries have an
accessible legal framework set up to deal with the issue. Some of these
laws, of course, were not enacted until after the PRI and DC lost much of
their power. Still, it appears that in countries struggling with clientelism
the answer does not lie in crafting additional legislation. Obviously some
anti-corruption legislation is necessary, but such legislation alone is not
sufficient. What is missing, rather, is a mechanism to ensure that existing
legislation is enforced.
171

Polity IV County Report 2010, supra note 46.
Fox, supra note 24, at 160-161.
173
Italy – Corruption Challenges, supra note 124.
172

19

20

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol. XV

Italy’s legislature is currently engaged in talks to establish a
separate entity to deal with corruption. Such an entity might be necessary
in order to ensure that any attempts to eliminate corruption come from an
exogenous source. Mexico currently lacks such an entity as well, although
the current President of Mexico recently proposed a National AntiCorruption Commission. The success of such an anti-corruption agency in
either country remains to be seen, but the fact that both countries are
attempting to establish such an entity is an encouraging sign. If Italy and
Mexico are successful, they will improve their popular legitimacy and
strengthen their social capital as they continue down a path towards
healthy democracy.
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